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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 14, 1994, the Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari in Commissioner v. Schleier.1 In Schleier, the
Court will attempt to resolve the continued confusion2 and circuit
c6nflicte surrounding the excludability from gross income of
awards or settlements in Age Discrimination in Employment Act4
("ADEA") claims under section 104(a)(2)' of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. The Court's resolution of this issue is pressing, not
only because of the ongoing confusion, but because of the increas-
ing number of age discrimination claims6 and the nontrivial size
of the awards.'
Against this background of confusion and importance, the
excludability of employment discrimination awards has not gone
without discussion. In 1992, the Supreme Court decided United
1 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir.) (table), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994) (No. 94-500).
2 See generally Robert J. Henry, Tort and Taxes, Taxes and Tort: The Taxation of Person-
al Injury Recoveries, 23 HouS. L. REv. 701, 701-02 (1986) (noting that although the tax
code has recognized a recovery from personal injury exclusion since 1918, confusion has
increased with each new court decision).
3 See infra notes 100-243 and accompanying text.
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see infra notes 86-99 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").
5 I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see infra notes 16-31 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of § 104(a) (2).
6 See Age Bias Claims Mount as Demographic, Legal Economic Pressures Increas Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53, at C-1 (Mar. 19, 1985) (noting the increased frequency of liti-
gation under the ADEA); Steven Pressman, Older Workers Enforce their Rights with Lawsuits,
DET. FREE PRESS, Mar. 17, 1989, at 1C (remarking that since 1980 more than 95,000 age
discrimination complaints have been filed with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission).
7 See Terry Pristin, Jury Awards $6.1 Million in Age Bias Lawsuit, L.A TIMES, Nov. 12,
1991, at D2 (announcing a $6.1 million verdict against a California real estate company
in an age discrimination suit); Con Freight Loses Suit on Age Bias, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 1,
1992, at BI (noting an award of $27 million against Consolidated Freightways, Inc. in an
age discrimination claim).
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States v. Burke.8 In Burke, the Court examined the excludability of
a Title VII sexual discrimination settlement, holding that-section
104(a)(2) did not exclude the settlement from gross income.'
However, many commentators have criticized the Burke decision."
Furthermore, while not joining in the direct criticism of Burke, the
lower courts have continued to apply differing analyses to the
taxation of employment discrimination awards or settlements."
These various approaches have resulted in different tax treatment
for similar employment discrimination claims, depending on the
type of claim and the venue in which the taxpayer's dispute is
adjudicated.
In Part II, this Note focuses on the Internal Revenue Code's
(the "Code") notion of income under section 61(a) and the scope
of and justification for the code's exclusion from gross income for
personal injury damages under section 104(a) (2). In addition, Part
II includes an examination of the recent Supreme Court decision,
United States v. Burke. Part III briefly describes the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967. The description will focus on the
ADEA's purpose, designated unlawful practices, and remedial
8 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992); see infra notes 32-85 and accompanying text.
9 Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874. In Schleier, the underlying claim is based on the ADEA.
Petitioner's Brief at 3, Schleier, (No. 94-500). The ADEA prohibits discrimination in the
workplace based on age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In Burke, the tax-
payers based their underlying claim on pre-1991 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended. Burke, 112 U.S. at 1868. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 29 U.S.C. §
2000e (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
10 See Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of Employment Discrimina-
tion Recoveries under Federal Civil Rights Statutes: Income from Human Capital Realization, and
Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L. REV. 547, 551 (1994) (commenting that "the Court declined an
opportunity to bring greater theoretical coherence and rationality to a difficult area of
federal income tax law."); Ray A. Knight et al., The Excludability of Damages for Personal
Injury after the Supreme Court's Decision in Burke 10 AKRON TAX J. 89, 89 (1993) ("Unfortu-
nately, the case was decided on narrow grounds, which may only add to, rather than
reduce, the conflict among the lower courts."); Kevin C. Jones, Comment, Taxation of
Personal Injury Damage Awards: A Call for a Definition of the Scope of the Section 104(a)(2)
Exclusion, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 919, 919 (1993) (asserting that "the Court's analysis assures
continued confusion"); Michael J. Minihan, Note, United States v. Burke: The Taxation of
Damages Recovered in Title VI Discrimination Actions, 13 PAcE L. REv. 1043, 1044 (1994)
(noting the Court's internal disagreement and describing the holding as "inconclusive");
Cathy Morris, Comment, The Taxation of Damages and Back Pay Awards in Light of United
States v. Burke: The Fog Thickens, 18 J. CORP. L. 769, 772 (1993) (noting that the "guid-
ance [the Court's decision] provides is limited and cloudy at best."). Contra David G.
Jaeger, Taxation of Back Pay Awards Under Title VII. Supreme Court Decides U.S. v. Burke, 70
TAxES 523, 530 (1992) (stating that the Burke decision "provides a great deal of guidance
regarding the exclusion of employment discrimination awards under § 104.").
11 See infra notes 100-243 and accompanying text.
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scheme. Part IV explores the current circuit conflict regarding
the applicability of the personal injury exclusion, section
104(a) (2), to ADEA awards or settlements. In Part V, this Note de-
scribes the various public policy arguments regarding the theoret-
ical underpinnings of section 104(a)(2). Finally, Part VI argues
that the Supreme Court, in United States v. Schleier, should hold
that certain federal employment discrimination claims are per se
"tort-like, 1 2  making the resulting awards or settlements
excludable from gross income as "damages ... received on ac-
count of personal injuries" under section 104(a)(2).
II. TAXABILITY OF PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS
A. Gross Income: I.R.C. Section 61(a)
The definition of gross income under the Internal Revenue
Code "sweeps broadly."" Section 61(a) provides that gross in-
come includes "all income from whatever source derived," unless
otherwise provided. 4 The Supreme Court has stated that Con-
gress has exerted "the full measure of its taxing power and [has
brought] within the definition of income any accession to
wealth."'5 An ADEA award or settlement is clearly an "accession
to wealth" and therefore income.
B. Statutory Exemption: LRC. Section 104(a)(2)
As described above, any accession to wealth is includable in
gross income, unless a statutory exemption specifically excludes
the income." Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that
statutory exemptions should be narrowly construed in favor of
12 Although this Note focuses on the dispute in the context of age discrimination
under the ADEA, the Note argues that the same analysis should apply to several other
federal antidiscrimination statutes that prohibit discrimination in the workplace, including
the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. V 1993), the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993), and employment relat-
ed claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (Supp. V 1993) and 1983 (1988). The issue
of whether § 104(a)(2) excludes state discrimination claims from gross income is beyond
the scope of this Note.
13 United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1870 (1992).
14 I.R.C. § 61(a) (1988).
15 Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1870 (citing Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426, 431 (1955), and Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)).
16 See Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 429-430.
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taxation. 7 However, damages received in a personal injury claim
are among those "accessions to wealth" that Congress has statutori-
ly exempted from gross income. Section 104(a) (2) excludes
"damages received .. .on account of personal injury" from gross
income.'"
Historically, the exclusion for damages received on account of
personal injury or sickness dates back to section 213(b)(6) of the
Revenue Act of 1918.1' The legislative history of the original sec-
tion suggests that Congress, by enacting section 213(b)(6), at-
tempted to codify early administrative positions. These adminis-
trative positions characterized the "human body [as] a kind of
capital" and payments from accident insurance as "a conversion of
capital lost through . . . injury."'2 In other words, accident insur-
17 See, e.g., United States v. Centennial Says. Bank, 499 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1991).
18 At the time of the settlement between the taxpayer and his employer in Schleier, §
104(a) (2) provided:
§ 104 Compensation for injuries or sickness.
(a) . . . [G]ross income does not include ...
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries
or sickness ....
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In 1989, Congress amended § 104(a)(2) to
provide that punitive damages not received for physical injury or sickness are includable
in gross income. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No 101-239, §
7641(a), 103 Stat. 2379 (1989). The amendment applied only to amounts received after
July 10, 1989. Id. § 7642(b)(2), 103 Stat. at 2379.
19 Section 213(b)(6) excluded from gross income:
Amounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen's
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the
amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of
such injuries or sickness.
Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. 65-254, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065-66 (1919).
Section 213(b)(6), in substantially the same form, has appeared in each intervening reve-
nue act and codification of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"). For an excellent
discussion of the history of § 104(a) (2) and § 213(b) (6), see J. Martin Burke & Michael
K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50
MONT. L. REV. 13, 14-23 (1989).
Before 1918, Treasury Regulations provided that amounts received for personal inju-
ry or sickness were includable in gross income. See Treas. Reg. No. 33, Revised, art. 4
(1918) (An "[a]mount received as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injury,
being similar to the proceeds of accident insurance, is to be accounted for as income.").
20 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 308 (1918). Shortly after the Attorney General's opinion,
the Treasury Department revoked Treasury Regulation No. 33 stating that the Code ex-
cludes "an amount received ... as a result of suit or compromise for personal injuries
sustained ... through accident" from gross income. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev.
457 (1918).
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ance benefits were a return of human capital and therefore, be-
yond the scope of the income tax.'
The legislative history also suggests that Congress intended to
adopt this return of capital theory. A House Report stated:
Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts received
through accident or health insurance, or under workmen's
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injury or
sickness, and damages received on'account of such injuries or
sickness, are required to be included in gross income. The pro-
posed bill provides that such amounts shall not be included in
gross income.2
In addition, early judicial decisions reflected the return of capital
theory, finding damages for physical as well as nonphysical injuries
excludable from gross income.'
In the adoption of the 1954 Code, Congress enacted the
modem version of the personal injury exclusion, section
104(a) (2).24 During the debate concerning section 104(a) (2), nei-
ther the House nor the Senate offered any explanation of what
constituted a "personal injury" for purposes of the section.'
In 1960, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") issued regula-
tions that linked identification of a "personal injury" with tradi-
tional tort principles.5 Moreover, the Burke court, in applying the
Treasury Regulation, held that the "essential element" of exclusion
under section 104(a) (2) is whether "the income involved [is] de-
rive[d] from some sort of tort claim against the payor ....27
21 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (reaffirming the proposition that a
return of capital is not taxable as income under the 16th Amendment); see also Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
22 H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 86,
92.
23 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.TA 1023 (1927), acq., 7 C.B. 14 (1928)
(holding that compensatory damages received in a libel and slander suit were excludable
from gross income); see also United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1871 n.6 (1992).
24 See supra note 18.
25 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d. Sess. 15-16 (1954).
26 Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1870. The regulations provided:
The term 'damages received (whether by suit or agreement)' means an amount
received . . . through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or
tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such
prosecution.
25 Fed. Reg. 11,490 (1960); 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1991).
27 Burke; 112 S. Ct. at 1870 (quoting Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1305
(1986), aff/d, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988)).
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Therefore, section 104(a) (2) excludes tort or tort-like claim recov-
eries from gross income but does not exclude contract claim re-
21coveries.
Discrimination in the workplace does not fit easily within this
framework because it can arise in a variety of contexts. For exam-
ple, the ADEA prohibits discrimination based on age in the hiring,
discharge, compensation, training, and classification of employ-
ees.' In other words, employment discrimination can arise be-
fore, as well as after the establishment of an employment relation-
ship. Once the employment relationship exists, the IRS has consis-
tently argued that employment discrimination arises from an
employee's contractual relationship with his or her employer."0
Thus, section 104(a)(2) should not exclude awards or settlements
in employment discrimination suits from gross income. On the
other hand, taxpayers have argued that employment discrimination
sounds in tort, similar to a dignitary tort, rather than in con-
tract. 1 Therefore, section 104(a)(2) should exclude the resulting
award or settlement from gross income
C. The Supreme Court's Decision in United States v. Burke:
Application of Section 104(a)(2) to Pre-1991 Title VI Claims
In United States v. Burke,32 the Supreme Court held, in a
seven-two decision,"3 that "backpay awards received ... in settle-
ment of ... Title VII claims are not excludable from gross in-
come ... under [section] 104(a)(2).""4
28 See Minihan, supra note 10 at 1046.
29 See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
30 See, e.g., Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1994), petition for
cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1994) (No. 94-944) (IRS arguing that ADEA
actions are basically ex contractu); see infra notes 204-25 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Schmitz.
31 See, e.g., Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 147 (6th Cir. 1990) (taxpayer
arguing that ADEA actions evidence a tort-like cause of action).
32 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992). For an excellent case comment on the Burke decision, see
Cynthia A. Sciuto, Comment, A Tort by Another Name: Taxation of Non-Physical Personal
Injury Damages After United States v. Burke, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 285 (1993).
33 Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices White, Stevens, and Kennedy joined the Court's opinion. Justices Scalia and Souter
concurred, each writing separately. Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Thomas joined.
34 Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874.
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1. The Majority Opinion
In Burke, the plaintiffs, three female employees of the Tennes-
see Valley Authority ("TVA"), filed a sexual discrimination suit
against the TVA under Title VII s Before trial, the parties
reached a settlement., The settlement provided that the TVA
would pay $5 million in total damages to the affected employees,
which included the three female plaintiffs." The TVA withheld
federal income and FICA taxes from the settlement awards before
payment was made to the employees."
Subsequent to the TVA's payment and withholding, the plain-
tiffs filed a refund claim for the amounts withheld. 9 The IRS de-
nied the refund claim, and the plaintiffs brought suit in the Unit-
ed States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.
The District Court -ruled that section 104(a) (2) did not ex-
clude the settlement from gross income as "damages received...
on account of personal injuries."41
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit, by a divided vote, reversed the
District Court's ruling." The Sixth Circuit determined that the
applicability of section 104(a) (2) depends on whether the injury
and claim are "personal and tort-like in nature."" Citing authori-
ty from the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that a claim under Title VII represented a
tort-like injury.44 Thus, the court of appeals held that section
104(a) (2) excluded the settlement proceeds from gross income. 5
35 Id. at 1868-69.





41 Burke v. United States, No. CIV-1-88-508, 1990 WL 56155 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20,
1990), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), revd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992). In determining
its findings, the District Court asked, "In lieu of what were the damages awarded?". Id. at
*6 (citing Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1107 (1983)). The District Court found
that the relief was in lieu of backpay because "the very core of the case was recovery of
wage deficiencies .... ." Id. at *7.
42 Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867
(1992).
43 Id. at 1121.
44 Id. (citations omitted).
45 Id. at 1123. The dissent argued that the taxpayer's recovery "was not a case in
which back pay is a means of measuring loss due to a tort." Id. at 1126 (Wellford .].,
dissenting). Rather, the taxpayer's recovery was intended to compensate the taxpayer for
1995]
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Sixth
Circuit's holding. In his majority opinion, Justice Blackmun initial-
ly noted that neither the legislative history nor the text of section
104(a) (2) offered a definition of a "personal injury."' Relying on
a Treasury Regulation that interprets section 104(a) (2), the Court
reasoned that a personal injury, for purposes of section 104(a) (2),
is linked to traditional tort principles.47
After reviewing the basic definition of a tort, the Court rea-
soned that "[r]emedial principles . figure prominently in the
definition and conceptualization of torts."4' Furthermore, "one of
the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a
broad range of damages . . . ."' Thus, the available remedies
were the critical factor in determining the "type of claim."" In
other words, if the underlying claim's remedies evidenced a tort-
like broad range of damages, the claim would be for "personal
injury," and the resulting damages would qualify for the exclusion
under section 104(a) (2) as "damages received . . . on account of
personal injuries or sickness."
The Court then examined the remedies available under Title
VII. Characterizing employment discrimination as an "invidious
practice which causes grave harm to its victims," the Court rea-
soned that this fact does not automatically imply a tort-like person-
al injury for federal tax purposes.51 However, the Court reasoned
that discrimination could be a personal injury within the meaning
of section 104(a)(2) if it "evidenced a tort-like conception of inju-
ry and remedy."52 The Court noted that Title VII's remedies were
limited to backpay, injunctions, and equitable relief. After exam-
ining Title VII's remedial scheme, the Court reasoned that the
lost earnings. Id. Thus, § 104(a)(2) should not exclude the recovery from gross income.
Id.
46 United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1870 (1992).
47 Id. (relying on Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1991)); see supra note 26 and accompa-
nying text.
48 Id. at 1870-71.
49 Id. at 1871. The Court noted that tort law may award damages larger than the
amount necessary to compensate a victim for actual monetary loss. Id. For example, the
Court remarked that physical injury victims may recover, in addition to actual expenses,
damages for pain and suffering. Furthermore, victims of a nonphysical tort, such as defa-
mation, can recover damages for loss of reputation and mental anguish. Id. at 1871-72.
50 Id. at 1872 n.7.
51 Id. at 1872-73 (citations omitted).
52 Id. at 1873 (remarking that racial discrimination could be treated as a dignitary
tort) (citation omitted).
53 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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scheme, other than its 'award of backpay and injunctive relief, did
not purport to compensate for the traditional harms associated
with personal injury: pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm
to reputation, or other consequential damages.' Comparing Title
VII to other federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Court deter-
mined that "the circumscribed remedies available under Title VII
stand in marked contrast" to those available under other
antidiscrimination statutes.55
In conclusion, the Court asserted that Title VII, "whose sole
remedial focus is the award of backwages, [does not] redress a
tort-like personal injury within the meaning of [section]
104(a) (2) ... ."' Thus, section 104(a) (2) does not exclude a
pre-1991 Title VII settlement from gross income as "damages re-
ceived . . .on account of personal injuries or sickness.""7
2. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that section
104(a) (2) did'not exclude the Title VII settlement from gross in-
come."8 However, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's anal-
ysis. Initially, Justice Scalia: rejected the Treasury Regulation's "tort
rights" test as "not within the range of reasonable interpretation of
the statutory text" of section 104(a) (2)."9 Applying the "common
connotation" to section 104(a)(2)'s term "personal injury" and
noting the IRS's original interpretation of the term, Justice Scalia
argued that only physical and mental injuries fall within the mean-
ing of "personal injury."' According to Justice Scalia, the sur-
rounding language should serve as the "critical factor" in deciding
whether words go beyond their common meaning.61 Furthermore,
54 Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1873.
55 Id. at 1873-74. For example, the Court noted that Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 provided for the availability of jury trials. Id In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
provided for jury trials, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Id.
56 Id. at 1874. The Court also addressed the taxpayer's argument regarding the
expansion, in 1991, of Title VII's remedial scheme. Id at 1874 n.12. The taxpayers ar-
gued that the expansion supported the inherent tort-like nature of Title VII. Id. In a
statement which seemed to limit the Court's decision, the Court noted that the expan-
sion of remedies in the amended act "signal[ed] a marked change in ... [the] concep-
tion of injury redressable by Title VII, and cannot be imported back into analysis of the
statute as it existed at the time of this lawsuit." Id.
57 Id. at 1874.
58 Id. at 1876 (Scalia, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 1875.
60 Id.
61 Id. Justice Scalia argued that since the word "sickness" means a physical illness,
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Justice Scalia argued that his "common-sense" interpretation was
supported by other language in section 104(a)(2) and the Court's
rule of narrow construction of tax exemptions.62
Armed with his "common-sense" interpretation of the term
"personal injuries," Justice Scalia concluded that " [t]he only harm
that Titie VII dignifies with the status of redressable legal injury is
the antecedent economic deprivation that produced the Title VII
violation ...."' Thus, the taxpayer did not receive the Title VII
settlement on "account of personal injuries" under section
104(a) (2).'
3. Justice Souter's Concurring Opinion
Justice Souter joined the majority in concluding that section
104(a) (2) did not exclude the Title VII settlement from gross
income. Justice Souter accepted the majority's notion that section
104(a) (2)'s exclusion required that the underlying claim be "based
upon tort or tort type rights" rather than upon contract rights to
qualify as an exclusion from income. 5 In other words, the under-
lying claim must be based in tort, not contract, to qualify for ex-
clusion. Justice Souter reasoned that there were "good reasons to
put a Title VII claim on the tort side of the line."' However, he
asserted that Title VII's limitation of recovery to back pay was a
"quintessential" contract measure of damages.67 Furthermore, he
characterized the rights guaranteed by Title VII, in an existing em-
ployment relationship, as essentially a "contractual term implied by
law." 'r In conclusion, Justice Souter noted that "good reasons tug
each way."69
Given the good reasons for each side, Justice Souter applied
the "default rule," requiring the Court to interpret exclusions from
gross income narrowly.7° Thus, because there was a clear "acces-
the phrase "personal injuries or sickness" should be interpreted to include only physical
or mental injury. Id.
62 Id. at 1875-76.
63 Id. at 1876.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1877 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1991)).
66 Id. Justice Souter noted a parallel between a defamation action and a Title VII
suit. Id. In addition, Justice Souter noted that the Court had recognized similarities be-
tween tort claims and other antidiscrimination claims, § 1981 and § 1983. Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1878.
69 Id
70 Id. (citing United States v. Centennial Says. Bank, 499 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1991)).
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sion to wealth" and no clear application of section 104(a) (2), Jus-
tice Souter concurred with the majority's result.7'
4. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Thomas joined, dissented
from the majority's holding. Both justices would have held the
Title VII settlement excludable from gross income as "damages
received ... on account of personal injuries" under section
104(a) (2).2 Initially agreeing with the majority, Justice O'Connor
noted that the majority seemed to accept the notion that
workplace discrimination causes personal injury." Furthermore,
she agreed that the Treasury Regulation was a reasonable interpre-
tation of section 104(a)(2) and therefore was the proper test for
exclusion.74  However, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the
majority's focus on the remedial scheme of Title VII, characteriz-
ing the focus as a "misapprehension" of the nature of the inquiry
required under section 104(a) (2) and its interpretative regula-
tion.75 Justice O'Connor asserted that the proper focus should be
on the "nature of the statute and the type of claim brought under
it."16
Concentrating on the nature of the claim, Justice O'Connor
reasoned that a Title VII claim "fundamentally differed from con-
tractual liability" and sounded in tort." Furthermore, she asserted
that the Court had previously found suits under antidiscrimination
in employment statutes, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and of 1871,
analogous to tort-like claims.7'
In addition, Justice O'Connor attempted to refute three of
the majority's reasons for taxation. First, she viewed as unpersua-
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1881 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 1878.
74 Id.
75 Id at 1879.
76 Id.
77 Id. In arguing that employment discrimination sounds in tort, Justice O'Connor
noted that Title VII employment discrimination is actionable without regard to a con-
tractual arrangement between the parties. Id For example, an interviewee may bring a
claim under Tide VII for discrimination during a job interview. In this situation, no em-
ployment contract exists between the parties. In addition, Justice O'Connor argued that
like tort damages, "monetary relief for violations of Title VII serves a public purpose
beyond offsetting specific losses." Id.
78 Id. at 1879-80 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277 (1985), and Goodman
v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987)).
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sive the majority's emphasis on the fact that Title VII plaintiffs
receive money that would have been taxable absent the discrimina-
tion.79 Justice O'Connor argued that excluding discrimination
awards from gross income simply puts the victims on "equal foot-
ing" with other victims of personal injury torts."0 Second, she im-
plied that the majority's reliance on the unavailability of a jury
trial in Title VII claims was misplaced." Justice O'Connor assert-
ed that the unavailability of a jury trial was irrelevant to the inqui-
ry of whether the taxpayer had suffered a personal injury.82 Final-
ly, she disagreed with the Court's "fundamental change" character-
ization of the 1991 amendments to Title VII's remedial scheme,
noting that Congress added the remedies to "effectuate an [al-
ready] established goal of Title VII." 5 Justice O'Connor argued
that the "protection afforded under Title VII has always been
expansive . . . .", even before the 1991 amendments to Title VII's
remedial scheme. 4
In conclusion, Justice O'Connor asserted that "Title VII offers
a tort-like cause of action," and therefore, section 104(a) (2) ex-
cluded Title VII awards or settlements from gross income.'
III. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT Acr
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 to prevent age discrimination in the workplace."
Congress's stated purpose in enacting the ADEA was "to promote
employment of older persons .. . ; to prohibit arbitrary age dis-
crimination . . . ; [and] to help employers and workers find ways
of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employ-
ment.
8 7
79 Id. at 1880. The majority had implied that by not taxing the backpay award, the
taxpayer would receive a windfall because the Code does not exclude earned wages from
gross income. See Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874 n.13.
80 Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1880 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 1880-81. The majority had argued that a lack of jury trials in Title VII
claims distinguished Title VII from Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and 42
U.S.C. § 1981. See id. at 1873-84; supra note 55.
82 Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1880-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 1881. The majority asserted that in 1991 Congress made a "marked change"
in its notion of the injury redressable under Title VII. See id. at 1874 n.12.
84 Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1881 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85 Id.
86 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). For an excellent general discussion of the ADEA, see
JOSEPH E. KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw (1990).
87 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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The ADEA, in a broad sense, "prohibits arbitrary discrimina-
tion in the workplace based on age. "s More specifically, the
antidiscrimination prohibitions extend to hiring, discharge, com-
pensation, training, and classification decisions regarding employ-
ees of at least age 40.9 The ADEA's broad prohibitions, however,
contain exceptions. For example, the ADEA exempts employment
decisions based on age when age serves as a reasonably necessary
bona fide occupational qualification.' As another example, the
ADEA allows an employer to mandate retirement at age 65 for
certain executives or high policy makers."
Initially, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1945 ("FLSA") served
as a model for the ADEA's remedial scheme.92 Accordingly, both
the FLSA and the ADEA authorize a private cause of action for
unpaid wages plus an equal amount of liquidated damages.93 The
ADEA provides for liquidated damages only when the plaintiff
proves a willful violation of the Act.94 Importantly, the ADEA nei-
ther expressly provides for punitive damages as a method of pun-
ishment nor compensatory damages as relief for pain or suffer-
ing.
9 5
88 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978).
89 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(I)-(2); id § 631(a)-(b). An employer may not "fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, term, condition, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's age." Id. § 623(a)(1). In addition, an employer may not "limit, segre-
gate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive . . . any individual of
employment opportunity ... ." Id § 623(a)(2).
90 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988).
91 Id. § 631(c)(1).
92 See id. § 626(b) (1988). The applicable FLSA provisions are found at 29 U.S.C. §§
211(b), 216, 217 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For an excellent discussion of the ADEA's legal
and equitable remedies, see KALET, supra note 86 at 105-57.
93 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988) (the FLSA remedial scheme) with 29 U.S.C.
626(b), (d) (1988) (the ADEA remedial scheme).
94 Id. § 626(b); see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126-27
(1984) for a definition of the term "willful" under the ADEA. In comparison, an ag-
grieved employee may receive liquidated damages under the FLSA unless the court finds
that the employer has proven that it acted in good faith and has reasonable grounds for
believing that it was not violating the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1988).
95 See KALET, supra note 86 at 129-30. "The conference report accompanying the
1978 ADEA amendments indicates congressional disapproval of [compensatory
awards] . . .on the ground that liquidated damages provide full relief for damages, such
as emotional or psychological distress, that are difficult to prove." Id. at 130; see H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 528,
535.
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In addition to legal remedies, the ADEA's remedial scheme
includes equitable relief.96 The ADEA grants courts the jurisdic-
tion to "effectuate the purposes of the Act" through any legal or
equitable remedy, including the award of attorney's fees.97 For
example, the court may enforce a judgment "compelling employ-
ment, reinstatement or promotion."98 Furthermore, whether an
action is brought in law or equity, the ADEA entitles the parties to
a trial by jury.?
IV. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
The circuit courts of appeals have not uniformly agreed on
the issue of whether section 104(a)(2) excludes ADEA awards or
settlements from gross income as "damages received on ac-
count of personal injuries or sickness.""°4 Before the Supreme
Court's decision in Burke, the Third and Sixth Circuits held that
section 104(a)(2) excluded ADEA settlements or awards from
gross income. After the Burke decision, the Fifth and Ninth Cir-
cuits also held that section 104(a)(2) excluded ADEA settlements
or awards from gross income. However, the Seventh Circuit held,
in a decision issued after Burke, that ADEA settlements or awards
are not excludable from gross income. A detailed description of
the underlying facts, procedure, and analysis in each circuit that
has considered the issue follows.
A. The Third Circuit
In Rickel v. Commissioner,' the Third Circuit held that sec-
tion 104(a) (2) excluded wage-related and liquidated damages paid
on account of an ADEA claim from gross income."2 In Rickel,
Malsbary Manufacturing Company ("Malsbary") employed the tax-
payer as a general sales manager.13 In 1979, when the taxpayer
turned 56 years old, the position of Malsbary president became
available.' Malsbary did not award the taxpayer the position of
96 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1988).
97 Id. § 626(b); 29 U.S.C. §§ 216 (b), 217 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
98 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
99 Id. § 626(c)(2).
100 See supra note 18.
101 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
102 Id. at 663-64.
103 Id. at 656.
104 Id.
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president."5 Subsequently, the new president, a person twenty
years younger than the taxpayer, terminated the taxpayer because
of a desire to have someone younger in his position.0 6
The taxpayer brought suit against his employer alleging a
violation of the ADEA. °'0 In his complaint, the taxpayer request-
ed reinstatement, back wages, liquidated damages, and attorney's
fees. ' During the trial, the parties reached a settlement that
provided for an immediate payment of $80,000 plus payment of
$25,000 for each of the next four years.' °9
On his tax return, the taxpayer excluded the settlement from
gross income."0 Subsequently, the IRS determined that the en-
tire amount of the settlement was includable in gross income,
arguing that the settlement proceeds represented either back pay
or punitive damages. The taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court for a
redetermination of the claimed deficiency.
In review of the case, the Tax Court determined that the
ADEA provided for recoveries based on contract and tort
claims."' The Tax Court held that: (i) liquidated damages
awarded under the ADEA "are intended to compensate for those
difficult to measure [tort-type] injuries that are the consequence
of age discrimination" and therefore section 104(a) (2) excluded
them from gross income; and (ii) wage-related damages are based
on breach of contract elements and therefore not excludable
under section 104(a) (2)."2 Because the settling parties did not
allocate the settlement payments between contract and tort claims,
and the ADEA equates the amount recoverable under the two
types of claims," 3 the Tax Court allocated one-half of the settle-
ment to a tort-like claim and the other half to a contractual




108 I at 657.
109 Id. at 656-57. The settlement did not allocate the damages to the taxpayer's re-
quest for back wages, liquidated damages, or attorney's fees.
110 Id. at 657.
111 Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510, 522 (1989), affid in part, rev'd in part, 900
F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
112 Id.
113 See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text for a description of the ADEA reme-
dial scheme.
114 Ricke4 92 T.C. at 522.
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tion of the claim but did not exclude the contractual portion of
the claim.
Reversing the Tax Court's decision in part, the Third Circuit
held that section 104(a)(2) excluded all of the damages from
gross income." 5 The Rickel court applied the "nature of the
claim" test adopted by the Tax Court in Threlkeld v. Commission-
er."6 Thus, in order "to determine whether the damages were
paid on account of personal injuries [and therefore excludable
from gross income under section 104(a)(2)] . . . we must look to
the nature of the claim and not to the consequences that result
from the injury.""' The Rickel court noted that the Tax Court's
analysis, determination of the nature of the claim and examination
of its consequences, had gone too far.' The court stated that
"once [the Tax Court] found that age discrimination was analo-
gous to a personal injury and that the taxpayer's ADEA action
amounted to the assertion of a tort type right" the analysis should
have ended. 9 The court asserted that the Tax Court had "cor-
rectly characterized age discrimination as more analogous to a
personal injury tort than a breach of contract."2 ' In support of
this proposition, the Third Circuit relied on a long history of oth-
er decisions that characterized workplace discrimination as a tort
claim."' In addition, the Rickel court rejected the government's
115 Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 664 (3d Cir. 1990).
116 Id. at 661 (noting that the Tax Court had correctly stated the Threlkeld test). The
Threlkeld court described the test as follows:
Section 104(a)(2) excludes from income amounts received as damages on ac-
count of personal injuries. Therefore, whether the damages received are paid on
account of "personal injuries" should be the beginning and the end of the in-
quiry. To determine whether the injury complained of is personal, we must look
to the origin and character of the claim, and not to the consequences that
result from the inquiry.
Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986), aft 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
117 Ricke/ 900 F.2d at 661 (quoting Ricke! 92 T.C. at 516).
118 Id.
119 Id. (noting that the Threlkeld test was made up of only one determination: wheth-
er the damages were paid on account of a personal injury).
120 Id. at 662.
121 Id. at 662-63. In noting this proposition, the Rickel court relied on the charac-
terization of another federal antidiscrimination statute, the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), in Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989). The Byrne court stated
that a FLSA anti-discrimination claim "alleges the violation of a duty owed the plaintiff
by the defendant employer which arises by operation of the [FLSA]. The duty is inde-
pendent of any duty an employer might owe his employee pursuant to an express or
implied employment contract; it arises by operation of law." Ricke! 900 F.2d at 662 (quot-
ing Byrne 883 F.2d at 215).
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argument that a successful .plaintiff in an ADEA suit would make
out better, in terms of federal income tax liability, than a person
who had not been the victim of discrimination.'22 In rejecting
this argument, the court noted that "the successful ADEA plaintiff
is being treated no better (or worse now) than the typical tort
victim who suffers a physical injury." "s In conclusion, the Rickel
court held that: (i) the taxpayer's ADEA claim "was analogous to
the assertion of a tort type right to redress a personal injury"; and
(ii) section 104(a) (2) excludes all damages received by the taxpay-
er from gross income.
B. The Sixth Circuit
In Pistillo'v. Commissioner,24 the Sixth Circuit held that sec-
tion 104(a) (2) excluded all damages received in an ADEA claim
from gross income."t s In Pistillo, the Cleveland Tool & Supply
Company ("Cleveland Tool") employed the taxpayer as a commis-
sioned salesman.1 2 ' Cleveland Tool terminated the taxpayer at 57
years of age and replaced him with a younger worker.127 After
termination, the taxpayer felt as if he had been a "victim of age
discrimination."128
After an unsuccessful attempt to conciliate, the taxpayer filed
a claim against Cleveland Tool alleging a violation of the
ADEA.I' A jury heard the case."s After the court instructed
In addition, the court relied on numerous other cases including. Goodman v.
Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 bars racial
discrimination, which is a "fundamental injury to the individual rights of a person");
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277 (1985) (holding that a violation of the Civil Rights
Acts of 1871 "is an injury to the individual person"); and Dillon v. AFBIC Development
Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a suit brought under the Fair
Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is "essentially an action in tort"). Ricke4
900 F.2d at 662-63.
122 Ricke 900 F.2d at 664.
123 Id.
124 Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990).
125 Id. at 150-151.
126 Id. at 146.
127 I& According to the evidence at trial, the taxpayer's manager had often made dis-
paraging remarks about the taxpayer's work and reputation. These remarks included
comments that the taxpayer was "old," had "gray hair," and was unable to relate to his
younger clients. Id.
128 ld.
129 Id. at 146. The taxpayer's complaint sought the following- (1) a declaration that
Cleveland Tool had discriminated against him on the basis of age; (2) a preliminary and
permanent injunction enjoining Cleveland Tool from abridging his rights; (3) reinstate-
ment to his previous position and payment of backpay, including overtime; and (4) reim-
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the jury that the taxpayer's award would not be subject to taxa-
tion, the jury returned a verdict for the taxpayer."' During ap-
peal to the Sixth Circuit, the parties reached a settlement, which
did not specify whether the payment was intended in lieu of
backpay or liquidated damages."2
On his 1982 tax return, the taxpayer excluded the settlement
from gross income, reasoning that section 104(a)(2) excluded the
settlement proceeds. t3 On November 6, 1986, the IRS issued a
notice of deficiency, asserting that the taxpayer received the settle-
ment award in lieu of lost wages, not personal injury.13 4 The tax-
payer petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the defi-
ciency.
15
The Tax Court, relying on its decision in Ricke, reaffirmed
that the ADEA provided for recoveries based on contractual and
tort claims.'36 The Tax Court examined numerous factors to de-
termine if Cleveland Tool made the payment for a breach of con-
tract, e.g., lost wages, or the violation of a tort-type right, e.g.,
liquidated damages.3 7  After examining the factors, the Tax
Court held that the taxpayer must include the entire settlement
payment in gross income. 3
bursement for reasonable attorney's fees. Id. at 146-47.
130 Id. at 147.
131 Id. at 147. The jury awarded the taxpayer $55,000 in "compensatory" damages.
The district court awarded the taxpayer $22,432.83 for attorney's fees. Id.
132 Id. The parties settled for $81,562.58. The settlement included: $58,000 for the




136 Pistillo v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 89,329, at 1627 (1989), rev'd, 912 F.2d
145 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Wirtz v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 89,139, at 650 (1989)
(holding that § 104(a)(2) excludes ADEA liquidated damages but does not exclude the
portion of payment for compensatory damages from gross income).
137 Pistillo, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 89,239, at 1626-29. The Tax Court noted that the most
important factor in determining the nature of the claim is "whether the . . . settlement
agreement contains express language stating that the payment was (or was not) made on
account of personal injury." Id. at 1626 (citing Byrne v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1000,
1007 (1988)). In addition, the Tax Court examined the following arguments made by the
taxpayer: (i) the settlement resolves potential tort claims which could have been included
in the ADEA suit; (ii) back pay should be an evidentiary factor, that is, the best measure
of loss, for computing the extent of tort injury; (iii) the failure of Cleveland Tool to
withhold federal income or social security taxes demonstrates an intent to compensate for
personal injury rather than lost wages; and (iv) informal, telephone advice given by an
IRS representative is binding. Id. at 1628-29.
138 Id. at 1629-30. The IRS maintained that gross income included the entire settle-
ment, $81,526.58 [sic]. Id. at 1625. However, the IRS conceded that § 212 allowed the
taxpayer a deduction for the amounts paid as attorney's fees, $22,706.18, and court
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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision
that section 104(a) (2) excluded the entire settlement from gross
income."9 Utilizing its holding in Threlkeld v. Commissioney" 6
and the Third Circuit's holding in Ridckel v. Commissioner,"' the
court concluded that an ADEA claim is "analogous to the assertion
of a tort-type right to redress personal injuries."4 2 The court stat-
ed that the taxpayer had "not brought separate actions to seek
back pay damages for his pain and suffering."' In addition, the
court determined that "whether Cleveland Tool paid [the taxpay-
er] a portion of the settlement award to compensate him for pain
and suffering or lost back pay is irrelevant to the inquiry."' Fi-
nally, the court noted that its decision would render the taxpayer
better off, in terms of federal tax liability, than if he had not been
a victim of age discrimination. However, the court stated that the
taxpayer was "entitled to receive federal tax treatment equal to
that received by the typical tort victim who suffers a physical inju-
ry . . . .,"' In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit held that section
104(a) (2) excluded the entire settlement received by the taxpayer
from gross income. "'
C. The Seventh Circuit
In Downey v. Commissioner,47 the Seventh Circuit held that
reporter's fees, $846.40. Id. The taxpayer had previously deducted $850.00 for court
reporter's fees. Id. Thus, the IRS asserted that the taxpayer should have included the net
amount, $58,850.00, in income for 1982. Id. Although the Tax Court held that the tax-
payer was required to include only $58,850.00 in income, the court effectively held that
the taxpayer must include the entire settlement in income. Id. at 1629-30.
139 Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 148 (6th Cir. 1990).
140 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
141 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
142 Pistillo, 912 F.2d at 149.
143 Id. at 150.
144 Id. at 150 n.6 (determining whether or not the damages are paid on account of
a personal injury is the beginning and the end of the inquiry) (citation omitted).
145 Id at 150. The Pistillo court reasoned that:
Just as the common law punishes tort-feasors, the ADEA punishes employers who
practice age discrimination - regardless of whether the discrimination manifests
itself in express acts of ageism or through more subtle and evasive forms. To
effectuate the purpose of both the ADEA and the IRC, we must make the vic-
tims of arbitrary age discrimination whole by providing equal recognition to the
substantial indignities and personal injuries they have suffered.
Id.
146 Id. at 150-51.
147 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec. 5,
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section 104(a) (2) does not exclude ADEA damages from gross in-
come because the damages do iot compensate the taxpayer for a
personal injury." In Downey, United Air Lines, Inc. ("United")
employed the taxpayer as an airline captain."' After the taxpayer
turned 60 years old, United retired the taxpayer against his will,
although FAA rules would have permitted him to continue to
serve as a member of a flight crew.
150
The taxpayer filed suit claiming that United willfully violated
the ADEA."5' Before trial, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement.1 52 The settlement agreement provided for a $120,000
payment by United to the taxpayer as consideration f6r the release
of all claims arising out of the employment relationship.' The
settlement agreement specifically allocated one-half of the payment
to nonliquidated damages, that is back pay, and one-half to liqui-
dated damages.
1 54
On his tax return, the taxpayer reported $60,000 of income
attributable to the nonliquidated damages, but he excluded the
remaining $60,000 attributable to the liquidated damages. 55 Af-
ter an examination of the taxpayer's return, the IRS issued a no-
tice of deficiency asserting that the taxpayer should have included
the $60,000 of liquidated damages in gross income.156 Subse-
quently, the taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermina-
tion of the assessment, arguing that section 104(a)(2) excluded
both the reported nonliquidated damages, as well as the liquidated
damages, from gross income.1 57
In a departure from its holdings in Rickel and Pistillo,55 the
1994) (No. 94-999).
148 Id. at 840.
149 Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150, 153 (1991) [hereinafter Downey 1], afl'd on
motion for reconsideration, 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), petition
for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1994) (No. 94-999).
150 Id. at 153-54. The Federal Aviation Administration Regulation, the Age 60 Rule,
precludes a person over the age of 60 from serving as an airline captain or first officer.
The regulation does not prohibit service as a second officer. However, United forbade
employees that had served as a captain from serving in any other flight crew position. Id.
151 Id. at 154-55. The taxpayer's complaint sought "reinstatement, retroactive seniority
rights, employee benefits as if [plaintiffs] employment had not been interrupted, back
pay plus interest, and liquidated damages." Id. at 154.
152 Id. at 155.
153 Id.
154 Id. The agreement also stated that the $60,000 payment for nonliquidated damag-
es would be subject to employment taxes. Id.
155 Id. at 156.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See supra notes 101-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rickel and
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Tax Court overruled its prior decisions and held that section
104(a)(2) excluded both nonliquidated and liquidated damages
from gross income.' Before the Tax Court, the taxpayer argued
that section 104(a)(2) excluded the damages, whether liquidated
or nonliquidated, from gross income.1" On the other hand, the
government argued that the nonliquidated damages represented a-
claim for back pay, not a claim for personal injury."' In addi-
tion, the government asserted the equivalency of ADFA liquidated
damages to punitive damages.6  Thus, section 104(a)(2) does
not exclude nonliquidated or liquidated ADEA damage awards
from gross income.
In its decision, the Tax Court first reviewed the history of the
section 104(a)(2) exclusion. 63 Noting that Congress limited the
exclusion to damages received on account of personal injury, the
Tax Court determined that exclusion depends on the nature of
the underlying claim rather than the claim's consequences."
Thus, if (i) the "claim is tort or tort-like" and (ii) the "nature of
the injury is personal," section 104(a)(2) will exclude the award
from gross income." In applying this two-part test, the Tax
Court stated that "age discrimination claims brought under the
ADEA have been found to be in the nature of tort or tort-like
claims."" Furthermore, the Tax Court determined that "courts
have held that invidious discrimination, including age discrimina-
tion, is a personal injury for purposes of section 104(a)(2).""6
Finding the nature of the claim tort-like and the nature of the
injury personal, the Tax Court determined that section 104(a)(2)
excluded both types of damages, liquidated and nonliquidated,
from gross income." In its determination, the Tax Court specifi-
cally overruled its prior decisions in Rickel and Pistillo. 9
Pistillo.
159 Downey , 97 T.C. at 173.
160 Id. at 156.
161 Id. at 156-57.
162 Id. at 157.
163 Id. at 157-59.
164 Id. at 161; see Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1297, 1299 (1986), aftd,
848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
165 Downey 1, 97 T.C. at 161 (citing Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121,
1123 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992)).
166 Id. at 165 (citing Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1990)).
167 Id. (citing Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121-22 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'4
112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992) and Pistiilo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1990)).
168 Downey , 97 T.C. at 165.
169 Id. at 168-70 (noting that the Third and Sixth Circuit opinions that overruled the
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Finally, the Tax Court determined that Congress intended and
the courts have interpreted the ADEA's liquidated damages to
serve both a compensatory and a punitive function, even though
the employer views the damages as purely punitive.17 ' The Tax
Court specifically rejected the government's argument of the
equivalency of ADEA liquidated damages to punitive damages.
171
Thus, the Tax Court held that the ADEA liquidated damages "are
intended to compensate the victim ... for certain nonpecuniary
losses and, thus, are excludable from gross income under section
104 (a) (2)."7
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Burke, the government motioned the Tax Court for reconsider-
ation of its decision in Downey L 73 Upon rehearing, the Tax
Court reaffirmed its earlier holding.7 4 In the majority opinion,
the Tax Court noted that Burke demonstrated that "discrimination
could constitute a 'personal injury' for purpose of section
104(a)(2) if the relevant cause of action evidenced a tort-like
conception of injury and remedy."175 In addition, the Tax Court
noted that the Burke decision stated the rule that, although em-
ployment discrimination causes harm to an individual, it does not
automatically imply the existence of a tort-like "personal inju-
ry." 176 Using the Burke decision as background, the Tax Court
distinguished ADEA claims from pre-1991 Title VII claims. 77 Un-
like pre-1991 Title VII claims, the Tax Court argued that the
ADEA offered a "range of remedies," including back pay and liqui-
dated damages. 78 Citing Downey I and Burke, the Tax Court not-
ed that liquidated damages under the ADEA serve as compensa-
tion for nonpecuniary losses, a remedy traditionally associated with
Tax Court's prior opinions in Rickel and Pistillo were "more consistent" with the Threkeld
opinion).
170 Id. at 171-72.
171 Id. at 171-73.
172 Id. at 170 (citing Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510, 521-22 (1989), rev'd on
other grounds, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990)).
173 Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634 (1993) [hereinafter Douey I], rev'd, 33
F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1994) (No.
94-999); see supra notes 32-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of Burke
174 Downey II, 100 T.C. at 637.
175 Id. at 635 (citing United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1873 (1992)).
176 Id. (citing Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1872-73).
177 Id. at 636-37.
178 Id. at 637. At the time of the Burke decision, Title VI's remedial scheme includ-
ed back pay, injunctions, and other equitable relief. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1873 n.3.
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tort-type claims."' Unlike a claim under pre-1991 Title VII which
had a limited remedial scheme, an ADEA claim evidenced a broad
range of tort-type remedies. 8 ' Thus, the Tax Court reaffirmed
that section 104(a)(2) excluded all ADEA damages from gross
income. 81
Although the Tax Court's decision in Downey II reaffirmed its
earlier holding, the opinion was not unanimous.8 2 In a concur-
ring opinion, Judge Cohen would have held that the taxpayer
received only the liquidated damages on account of a tort-like
injury.' Judge Cohen believed that Burke did not support the
majority's result.'84 Judge Cohen stated that "two categories of
statutory remedies do not" constitute a range as envisioned by
Burke." Finally, Judge Cohen concurred because Burke did not
provide a "clear-cut" reason for changing the result in Downey
186
In his concurrence, Judge Halpern criticized the majority's
opinion as "overbroad."'87 He asserted that the majority opinion
found "in all instance[s], the remedies available under the ADEA
are sufficiently broad to evidence 'a tort-like conception of injury'
and that, therefore, in all instances 'discrimination under the
ADEA constitutes a tort-like personal injury.""' Judge Halpern
noted that because the ADEA provides for liquidated damages
only in cases of willful discrimination, the ADEA provides "two
mutually exclusive causes of action: [o]ne for willful discrimina-
tion, and one for nonwillful discrimination." 9 He argued that
an ADEA suit not involving willful discrimination, that is, no liqui-
dated damages, would not evidence a tort-like concept of injury
and remedy under Burke.9° Because Downey I involved a cause of
179 Downey II, 100 T.C. at 637.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Eleven judges joined in the Downey II majority opinion. Two judges concurred in
the result, and one concurred in part and dissented in part.
183 Downey 1, 100 T.C. at 638 (Cohen, J., concurring).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 638-39.
187 Id- at 639 (Halpern, J., concurring). Judge Halpern opined the majority opinion
in Downey I.
188 Id. at 640 (quoting the majority opinion).
189 Id. at 641. Section 7(b) of the ADEA provides that "liquidated damages shall only
be payable in cases of willful violations of the Act." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
190 Downey I, 100 T.C. at 641 (Halpern, J., concurring). In a nonwillful action, the
ADEA provides only for recovery of backwages. Id. Backwages are the only recovery al-
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action for willful discrimination, "for which injury the sufficiently
broad range of remedy of liquidated damages is available," Judge
Halpern concurred in the majority's result.9 '
In a separate opinion, Judge Laro concurred in part and
dissented in part."2  Arguing that the taxpayer's settlement
should have been bifurcated between tort and contract claims,
Judge Laro would have found the liquidated damages attributable
to a tort claim, therefore excludable from gross income. 9 3 How-
ever, Judge Laro would have attributed the taxpayer's back pay
award to a contract claim, finding it not excludable from gross in-
come.194 Furthermore, Judge Laro noted that a nonwillful ADEA
suit, where the plaintiff's recovery is limited to back pay, is analo-
gous to the Title VII case in Burke in which the Supreme Court
did not find the requisite tort-like personal injury needed for
exclusion.' 95
In a decision to reverse the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit
held that section 104(a)(2) did not exclude any portion of the
ADEA settlement from gross income. 9 Applying the Treasury
Regulation drafted to interpret section 104(a) (2), the Seventh
Circuit examined whether an ADEA claim is based on a tort-type
right.'97 Although the Downey court stated that other circuits had
considered whether an ADEA claim was tort-like, it limited its dis-
cussion to Burke as "the most pertinent teaching on the mat-
lowed in a Title VII suit. Id. Because both suits entitle the taxpayer to only one remedy,
recovery of back pay, Judge Halpern inferred that the Burke court would not find a
nonwillful ADEA suit distinguishable from a Title VII case. Id.
191 Id. at 643.
192 Id. (Laro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193 I& at 647.
194 I&
195 Id. at 649.
196 Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed,
63 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1994) (No. 94-999).
197 Id. at 838-39. Although not expressly adopting Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
in Burke, the Downey court recognized it as "cogently argued" and with "considerable at-
traction." Id at 838. In Burke, Justice Scalia argued that the plain meaning of §
104(a)(2) excluded only awards relating to injuries of a taxpayer's physical or mental
health. Id (citing to United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1874 (1992) (Scalia, J., con-
curring)); see supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Scalia's
concurrence. In other words, § 104(a)(2) does not exclude non-physical damages, includ-
ing damages awarded for age discrimination under the ADEA, from gross income.
Moreover, Justice Scalia suggested that the Court should not give judicial deference
to the Treasury Regulation meant to enforce § 104(a)(2) because it is not within the
reasonable interpretation of the statutory text. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874; see supra notes
59-62 and accompanying text.
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ter."9 ' Interpreting Burke, the Seventh Circuit stated that "the
hallmark of tort liability is the availability of a broad range of
damages. .. ."" In addition, the court noted that although tort
damages are often described in compensatory terms, they usually
"redress intangible elements of injury."2" Therefore, the court
stated that:
[w]e believe that Burke stands for the proposition that a federal
anti-discrimination statute must provide compensatory damages
for intangible elements of personal injury (such as pain and
suffering, emotional, distress, or personal humiliation) to con-
stitute a tort-type personal injury and receive tax exempt treat-
ment under § 104(a) (2). °
The Seventh Circuit determined that ADEA litigants, whether
receiving liquidated or nonliquidated awards, could "not recover
the broad range of compensatory damages.., that characterize
tort-type pers6 nal injury ... "202 Asserting that an ADEA claim
"lack[s] the essential element of a tort-type claim," the Seventh
Circuit held that section 104(a)(2) does not exclude an ADEA
award or settlement from gross income as "damages ... received
on account of personal injury."
2
11
D. The Ninth Circuit
In Schmitz v. Commissioner,2°4 the Ninth Circuit, on materially
identical facts to Schleier and Downey, held that section 104(a) (2)
excluded ADEA wage-related and liquidated awards from gross in-
come.2 11 In Schmitz, United Air Lines, Inc. settled an age discrim-
198 Downey, 33 F.3d at 838. In addition, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Third
Circuit's opinion in Rickel and the Sixth Circuit's opinion in- Pistio predated the Su-
preme Court's decision in Burke. I&
199 Id. at 839.
200 19- (quoting Burke 112 S. Ct. at 1871).
201 Id-
202 Id The Downey court noted that under the ADEA litigants could not recover
damages for pain and suffering or emotional distress. Id. In addition, liquidated damages,
whether characterized as punitive or contractual remedies, "do not compensate for the
intangible elements of a personal injury." Id at 840.
203 Id.
204 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.LW. 3462 (U.S. Nov. 23,
1994) (No. 94-944).
205 Id. at 796; see also Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542, 548 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding pre-Burke that § 104(a) (2) excludes economic damages awarded in an
ADEA action from gross income). See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the facts in Downey, infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text for a discus-
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ination suit with an involuntarily retired airline captain."° The
settlement agreement provided that one-half of the award repre-
sented back pay and one-half represented liquidated damages."'
On their tax return, the taxpayers reported the back pay
portion of the settlement as income but excluded the liquidated
damages portion. 8 After the Commissioner issued a notice of
deficiency, the taxpayers filed a Tax Court petition arguing that
section 104(a)(2) excluded both components of the settlement,
back pay and liquidated damages, from gross income.2
Reaffirming its earlier holdings in Downey I and Downey I, the
Tax Court, in a unpublished order, granted summary judgment in
favor of the taxpayers.10
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's grant
of summary judgment.2 1' Applying a two-part test adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Hawkins, 212 the Schmitz court con-
cluded that the ADEA creates a "tort-like" cause of action and the
taxpayer's damages were received "on account" of a personal inju-
ry.
213
First, the Schmitz court determined that the ADEA created a
tort-like cause of action. The court noted that the Burke court
would have held an award excludable under section 104(a) (2) if it
"evidenced a tort-like conception of injury and remedy."2 '4 The
court believed that the Supreme Court limited its holding in Burke
sion of the facts in Schleier.
206 Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 791.
207 Id. (quoting the settlement agreement).
208 Id
209 Id
210 Id.; see supra notes 158-195 and accompanying text for a discussion of Downey I
and Downey II.
211 Id at 796.
212 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. Dec. 9,
1994) (No. 94-1041). In Hawkins, the Ninth Circuit held that § 104(a)(2) excludes dam-
ages received in a suit if the taxpayer demonstrates that: (i) the underlying cause of
action is tort-like within the meaning of Burke and 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) and (ii) the
damages were received "on account of" a personal injury. Id. at 1083.
213 Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 792. In a concurring opinion, Judge Trott agreed with the out-
come of the majority opinion but disagreed with the two-part Hawkins test. Id at 796-97
(Trott, J., concurring). Judge Trott believed that the court should focus solely on wheth-
er the ADEA redresses a tort-like personal injury claim. Id. at 797. Judge Trott argued
that if the court had properly applied the Hawkins test, it would have treated the ADEA
liquidated damages as taxable punitive damages. Id at 799.
214 Id. (quoting United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1873 (1992)). The Schmitz
court believed that the Burke Court based its holding on the fact that Title VII did not
provide for jury trials, compensatory damages, or punitive damages. Id.
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to pre-1991 Title VII claims." 5 Rejecting the government's argu-
ment equating an ADEA suit to a contract action, the Schmitz
court reasoned that the ADEA created a tort-like duty not to
discriminate." Furthermore, the court distinguished an ADEA
claim from a Burke-type Title VII suit, noting that the ADEA al-
lowed for a greater amount of tort-like remedies. 17 Because of
the, greater availability of tort-like remedies and because discrim-
ination had long been recognized as a personal injury, the Schmitz
court held that an ADEA action evidenced a tort-like cause of ac-
218tion.
Second, the Schmitz court reasoned that the taxpayer received
liquidated damages "on account of' a personal injury.1 9 Initially,
the court agreed with the government's position that section
104(a)(2)'s "on account of' language implied that section
104(a) (2) does not exclude damages unless "they have some com-
pensatory purpose and bear some relationship to the taxpayer's
underlying personal injury."22' However, the Schmitz court dis-
agreed with the government's position that ADEA liquidated dam-
ages are solely punitive and bear no relationship to the underlying
injury." Noting that courts have traditionally awarded liquidated
damages to compensate victims for obscure damages, the court
stated that "[i]f Congress said 'liquidated,' we will assume that
Congress meant 'liquidated' and not punitive."222 Furthermore,
the court characterized ADEA damages, unlike punitive damages,
as bearing a relationship to the underlying personal injury of a
taxpayer: "[t]hey must equal the plaintiff's total pecuniary
loss. " 223 Believing that "Congress' use of the term liquidated is
215 Id. at 793-94 ("[The Burke Court] held only that the pre-1991 version of Title VII,
with its 'circumscribed remedies', did not evidence a tort-like conception of personal inju-
ry.".).
216 Id. at 793 (noting that the duty not to discriminate exists whether or not a con-
tractual agreement exists).
217 Id. at 793-94 (noting that the ADEA allowed for jury trials, liquidated damages,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages).
218 Id. at 794.
219 Id. at 796.
220 Id. at 794 (citing United States v. Hawkins, 30 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 1994),
petition for cert. filed 63 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-1041). In addition, the
court noted that the government apparently conceded that if the ADEA does create a
tort-like cause of action the taxpayer's back pay settlement is "on account of" a personal
injury and excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2). Id. at 794 n.4.
221 Id. at 794.
222 Id. at 795.
223 Id. (noting that under the ADEA, the more severe a plaintiffs economic damage,
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dispositive," the court reasoned that "liquidated damages are tradi-
tionally compensatory; punitive damages are not."24 Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that section 104(a) (2) excluded
ADEA liquidated damages from gross income because an ADEA
action evidences a tort-like cause of action and the taxpayer re-
ceived ADEA damages on account of a personal injury.
E. The Fifth Circuit
In Schleier v. Commissioner, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, without
opinion, an unreported Tax Court order holding that section
104(a) (2) excluded an airline employee's settlement for back pay
and liquidated damages under the ADEA from gross income.
In Schleier, United Air Lines, Inc. employed the taxpayer as an air-
line captain. Pursuant to an established policy, United involuntarily
terminated the taxpayer at age sixty.
227
After being terminated, the taxpayer filed suit alleging age dis-
crimination under the ADEA.225 Subsequently, the taxpayer con-
solidated his ADEA claim within a class action suit with other
similarly situated United employees. 2' Before the trial, the par-
ties agreed to settle.2' The agreement provided that one-half of
the settlement represented backpay and one-half represented liqui-
dated damages.231
On their tax return, the taxpayers reported the backpay por-
tion but not the liquidated damages portion of the settlement. 
2
After receiving a notice of deficiency asserting failure to pay taxes
on the liquidated damages, the taxpayer filed a petition for rede-
termination in the Tax Court.2"3 The taxpayer's petition alleged
the greater the liquidated damage award). In addition, the Schmitz court recognized that
the liquidated damages would likely have a punitive effect on the employer. Id. Howev-
er, the court emphasized that "the mere fact that liquidated damages are available ...
does not transform them into punitive damages or eliminate their compensatory pur-
pose." Id.
224 Id. at 796.
225 Id.
226 Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir.) (table), cert. granted, 115 S.Ct.
507 (1994) (No. 94-500); see also Paul M. Barrett, Supreme Court to Rule if Settlements In
Age-Bias Lawsuits Can Be Taxed, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1994, at A4.





232 Id. at 4.
233 Id.
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that section 104(a) (2) excluded the liquidated damages and the
previously reported backpay from gross income.' Thus, the tax-
payer sought a determination of overpayment from the Tax
Court.s
Based on its holdings in Downey v. Commissioner,' the Tax
Court, in an unpublished order, granted the taxpayer's mo-
tion."s The Commissioner appealed.'
While the suit was pending on appeal, the Fifth Circuit, in
Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 9 adopted the Tax
Court's holding in Downey I & ff.24 Given the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Purcell, the Commissioner requested an en banc review
of the appeal. 4' The Fifth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's
request.242 Without opinion, the Fifth Circuit then affirmed the
Tax Court's order.24 In effect, the Fifth Circuit held pursuant to
Purcell that all damages received in an ADEA claim were "re-
ceived ; . . on account of personal injuries" under section
104(a) (2) and therefore excludable from gross income.
V. THE PUBLIC POLICY ALTERNATIVES
The established principles and policies that underlie the defi-
nition of income and the interpretation of exclusions are seeming-
ly straightforward. For example, the Supreme Court has defined
income broadly and exclusions from income narrowly.' 0 Al-
234 Id.
235 Id. The taxpayer's request for a refund was authorized by IR.C. § 6512(b)
(1988).
236 See supra notes 158-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of Downey I and
Downey I.
237 Petitioner's Brief at 7, Scheier (No. 94-500).
238 I&
239 999 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1993). In Purcel, the Fifth Circuit addressed a damages
issue in connection with a private cause of action under the ADEA. Id. at 955. The Unit-
ed States was not a party to the suit. Id. While deciding whether an ADEA backpay
award should be augmented to reflect the employee's increased tax liability, the Purcell
court held that "ADEA claims are tort-like." Id at 961. Thus, the Purcell court deter-
mined, relying on the Tax Court's rulings in Downey I & I, that § 104(a)(2) excluded
"an ADEA award from gross income as "damages ... received on account of personal
injuries or sickness." Id.




244 See United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1870 (1992) (stating that the Code's
definition of income "sweeps broadly"); United States v. Centennial Says. Bank, 499 U.S.
573, 583-84 (1991) (stating that statutory exemptions should be construed narrowly);
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though the exclusion under section 104(a) (2) fits within this
framework, the courts arguably have had a difficult time interpret-
ing section 104(a) (2) because Congress has never precisely defined
the specific policies underlying the exclusion. Given the impreci-
sion of the policy underlying section 104(a) (2), commentators
have argued that Congress intended the exclusion to be based on
one or more of the following justifications: (i) the humanitarian
or compassion theory; (ii) the bunching of income theory; (iii)
the return of capital theory; and (iv) the burdensome allocation
theory.245 Taking it one step further, some commentators have
called for the repeal or amendment of the, exclusion. A brief
discussion of each of these theories and the calls for amendment
or repeal follows.
A. Humanitarian or Compassion Theory
Some courts and commentators, as well as the taxpayers in
Schleier, have argued that Congress enacted section 104(a) (2) out
of compassion for the victims of personal injury. 46 In his dissent-
ing opinion in Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, Justice
Blackmun noted that "Congress may have intended to confer a
humanitarian benefit on the victim or victims of [personal inju-
ries]" by enacting section 104(a) (2).47 Similarly, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has described the humanitarian theory as "a feeling that the
injured party, who has suffered enough, should not be further
burdened with the practical difficulty of sorting out the taxable
and nontaxable components of a lump-sum award." 24 In Schleier,
the taxpayers argue that the compassion theory is the best justifi-
cation for excluding, in appropriate circumstances, backpay from
gross income.249 Furthermore, the taxpayers reason that the hu-
manitarian theory's focus "furthers the humanitarian objectives of
[employment antidiscrimination statutes]."25
supra notes 13, 17 and accompanying text.
245 For an excellent discussion of the policy alternatives, see Heen, supra note 10, at
560-67, and Margaret Henning, Recent Developments in the Tax Treatment of Personal Injuiy
and Punitive Damages Recoveries, 45 TAX LAV. 783, 795-99 (1992).
246 See Respondent's Brief at 21-22, 24, Schleier (No. 94-500); Burke & Friel, su-
pra note 19, at 43-44; Heen, supra note 10, at 561; Henning, supra note 245, at 798-97;
Henry, supra note 2, at 728-29.
247 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 501 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
248 Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1983).
249 Respondent's Brief at 24, Schleier (No. 94-500).
250 Id.
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Some commentators have criticized the humanitarian or com-
passion theory. Professors Burke and Friel have argued that "not
all damages on account of involuntary personal injuries-and per-
haps relatively few-warrant" exclusion under section
104(a) (2).'' In addition, some commentators have questioned
why Congress would have afforded "humanitarian" tax treatment
only to compensated victims, rather than to the truly needy, the
uncompensated victims.as
2
B. Bunching of Income Theory
Personal injury awards or settlements often result in the tax-
payer receiving a lump sum payment. Especially in the case of
backpay, a taxpayer would have received the lump sum payment
over a period of years. The bunching of income theory argues
that "it is unfair to subject such an award [or settlement] to the
progressive rate structure of federal income tax, since the bunch-
ing usually forces the recipient into a higher marginal tax brack-
et." S As further justification, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 elimi-
nated the Code's income averaging provisions, which allowed tax-
payers to even the flow of taxable income for computing their tax
liability.
As an example of the effect of income bunching, consider
this example, which assumes that section 104(a) (2) does not ex-
clude ADEA awards or settlement from gross income.' Suppose
that a single individual is fired from his or her job. The employee
then sues the employer for age discrimination under the ADEA.
Before trial, the parties settle the claim for a sum which includes
251 Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 43. Another commentator has asserted that given
the proliferation of nonphysical torts, e.g. age discrimination and sex discrimination,
Congress would not have intended nonphysical tort awards to receive favorable tax treat-
ment. Henning, supra note 245, at 797 n.114.
252 Henning, supra note 245, at 797 n.114; Henry, supra note 2, at 728-29.
253 Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 43, 49 (1987-88); see also Edward Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and
Non-Tax Policy Considerations, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 701, 714-19 (1977) (examining the
bunching of income theory).
254 This highly simplified example assumes that the damage award is the sole income
of the taxpayer during the current year, and that the taxpayer has no offsetting deduc-
tions other than a personal exemption and a standard deduction. The calculations reflect
only 1994 tax rates, personal exemption, and standard deduction amounts. The calcula-
tions do not reflect the personal exemption phaseout. Even though the computations do
not reflect inflation adjustments for 1990-93, the example demonstrates the practical ef-
fect of income bunching. For a similar example, see Yorio, supra note 253, at 716.
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$200,000 in backpay for the years 1990-93. The $200,000 is paid in
1994. Since the Code taxes settlements in the year of receipt,"ss
the taxpayer's tax liability for 1994 is $59,462. 6 In contrast, if
the taxpayer had earned $50,000 over the four years from 1990-93,
the total tax liability would have been $37,172. 7 Thus, because
of the lump sum payment the taxpayer paid an additional $22,290
of tax.
C. Return of Capital Theory
As discussed in Part II.B., Congress originally enacted the ex-
clusion under section 104(a) (2) with a view of the human body as
a type of capital."s Under this argument, awards or settlements
in personal injury cases were seen as a tax-free recovery of human
capital and therefore not "income."" This argument assumes
that each taxpayer has a basis in themselves, consisting of the
taxpayer's expenditures for food, education, medical attention,
exercise, etc.
260
Commentators have widely criticized the notion that awards or
settlements in personal injury cases are merely a return of human
capital.26 ' First, commentators have noted that the Code has nev-
255 Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931) (holding that if a recovery
is taxable, it must be included in income during the year of recovery, not in the year of
the loss).
256 I.RC. § 1(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ($31,040 plus 36% of the excess of gross in-
come over $115,000).
257 Id. ($3,413 plus 28% of the excess of gross income over $22,750 or $9,293 per
year).
258 See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
259 See Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Developing a Theory of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 WM.
MrrCHELL L. REV. 759, 766-68 (1988); see also Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 42.
Gross income includes "gains derived from dealings in property." I.R.C. § 61(a)(3)
(1988). Gains are calculated by subtracting an asset's basis from the amount realized. Id.
§ 1001(a). The basis of an asset is its "tax cost," id. § 1012, and the amount realized is
the "sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than
money) received," id. § 1001(b).
Presumably, under the human capital theory, a taxpayer would realize no gain be-
cause his basis in human capital would exceed the amount realized.
260 See generally Paul B. Stephan, III, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70
VA. L. REv. 1357 (1984) (discussing a basis in human capital and its relevant compo-
nents).
261 See Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 42 (asserting that the human capital ap-
proach suffers from "severe limitations"); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 143, 152-53 (1992) (arguing that the human capital theory is not coherent). Con-
tra Brooks, supra note 259, at 805 (arguing that human capital approach should be the
"touchstone" for the policy behind § 104(a)(2)); Heen, supra note 10, at 606-617 (assert-
ing that the Burke "tort-like" standard should be replaced with a human capital ap-
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er recognized a basis in human capital.26 Second, assuming that
the Code recognized a basis in human capital, commentators have
argued that the basis would be nearly impossible to calculate."
Third, commentators note that the human capital theory assumes
the award or settlement does not exceed the taxpayer's basis in
human capital.2" Finally, some courts have argued that the hu-
man capital argument fails when the award or settlement includes
items that are not return of capital, such as backpay or punitive
damages."
D. Burdensome Allocation Theory
Personal injury claims often consist of several components,
taxable and nontaxable. The burdensome allocation theory argues
that allocation of these components "poses too great a burden on
taxpayers."2" Furthermore, some supporters of the theory pre-
sume that it is "too difficult if not impossible to determine" the
proper allocation of taxable and nontaxable components.267
Most commentators have criticized the burdensome allocation
theory as meritless. Noting that there are numerous situations
where the taxpayer and the government make difficult alloca-
proach).
262 See Dodge, supra note 261, at 153 (arguing that "human capital should not be
treated as a conventional asset with basis.").
263 See Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 42 ("the practical and administrative difficul-
ties inherent in [accounting for human capital] seem insurmountable"); Dodge, supra
note 261, at 153 (asserting that "it is impossible to keep track of costs" associated with
human capital).
264 See Yorio, supra note 253, at 712 ("[I]f a damage recovery does . . . compensate
for the destruction of human capital, it would seem that the excess of recovery over the
taxpayer's basis in the human capital should be taxable.").
265 See Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150, 159 (1991), affd on motion for reconsid-
eration, 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63
U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1994) (No. 94-999) ("We doubt whether the return of capi-
tal theory justifies the exclusion from income the full range of damages found to be
excludable under § 104(a)(2), particularly damages received in lieu of lost income.").
But see Hawkins v. Commissioner, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63
U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-944) (using the "return of capital" metaphor
to distinguish the exclusion of compensatory damages from the taxation of purely puni-
tive damages).
266 Henning, supra note 245, at 797; see also Henry, supra note 2, at 726 ("since a
single unallocated judgment often consists of several components, some taxable, some tax
free, a successful plaintiff would have difficulty determining the taxable amount.");
Malcom L. Morris, Taxing Economic Loss Recovered in Personal Injury Actions: Towards a Capi-
tal Idea?, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 735, 742, 744 (1986) (describing the argument as "avoidance
of administrative convenience").
267 Morris, supra note 266, at 742.
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tions,2" Professor Morris argues that "[t]he addition of one
more would not cause the system to collapse." 9 Furthermore,
the courts as well as the IRS have provided the taxpayer with
ample guidance in the allocation process.
70
E. Calls for Repeal or Amendment
Some commentators have argued for the repeal or amend-
ment of section 104(a) (2). The commentators that favor repealing
section 104(a) (2) argue that tax policy simply does not justify the
exclusion of personal injury awards or settlements from in-
come.27 1 Other commentators have urged amending section
104(a) (2) to respond to the continued judicial confusion and to
reflect reasoned tax policy. These suggestions have included
amending section 104(a) (2) to not exclude from gross income:
nonphysical injuries,272  lost earnings,273  punitive damages,274
and all economic losses.275  Furthermore, other commentators
have suggested that Congress draft an uniform standard for ap-
plying section 104(a) (2).276
VI. A PROPOSAL
Against this confused and convoluted background, the Su-
preme Court, in Commissioner v. Schleier, should hold that federal
employment discrimination claims are "tort-like." Under this ap-
proach, a federal employment discrimination claim, whether based
268 As an example, Professor Morris points out the difficulty, under § 162, in allocat-
ing between personal and business travel expenses. Id. at 744.
269 Id.
270 See Henning, supra note 245, at 797 n.119 (citing to numerous cases and IRS
revenue rulings in support of this conclusion).
271 See Cochran, supra note 253, at 64-65; Lawrence A. Frolik, Personal Injury Compensa-
tion as a Tax Preference, 37 ME. L. REV. 1, 35-39 (1985); Susan K. Matlow, Exclusion of Per-
sonal Injury Damages: Have the Courts Gone Too Far?, 44 VkND. L. REV. 369, 392 (1991); see
also Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 46; Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain - No Gain? Should
Personal Injury Damages Keep Their Tax Exempt Status?, 9 U. ARK. LrrTLE ROCK LJ. 407, 428
(1986-87).
272 Stephan I. McIntosh, Comment, Defining the Intersection of Tort and Tax Law: Recent
Developments Regarding the Exclusion of Personal Injury Damages, 6 VA. TAX REV. 425, 454
(1986).
273 Chapman, supra note 271, at 428; Lorraine S. Boss, Note, Taxation and Personal
Injury Awards: The Search for a Wor*able Guidelines, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 628, 646 (1988).
274 Chapman, supra note 271, at 428.
275 Morris, supra note 266, at 747.
276 Id. at 787-88; David D. Willoughby, Recent Developments, The Taxation of Defama-
tion Recoveries: Toward Establishing Its Reputation 37 VAND. L. REv. 621, 643 (1984).
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on the ADEA,277 the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),278
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,279 the
Equal Pay Act ("EPA), 28 ° or the employment-related provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
codified respectively at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("section 1981"1)281 and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983"),82 would per se qualify as a
tort-like claim. Thus, the resulting settlement or award, excluding
punitive damages, 23 would qualify for exclusion from gross in-
come under section 104(a)(2) as "damages received ... on ac-
count of personal injuries or sickness."
This approach is advantageous for a number of reasons. First,
the majority of case law supports the per se approach. This body of
case law holds that the nature of a federal employment discrimina-
tion claim involves tort-like injury to personal rights. Second, pub-
lic policy supports the per se approach. For example, the humani-
tarian and bunching of income theories justify the per se rule. In
addition, adoption of the per se approach would effectuate the
purposes of equal opportunity laws, promote consistent outcomes,
and alleviate continued litigation. Finally, the Supreme Court's
adoption of a per se rule would remain consistent with its holding
in United States v. Burke. A more detailed examination of this rea-
soning follows.
277 See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ADEA.
278 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting employment discrimination
against employees with disabilities).
279 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (making it unlawful for an employer
to discriminate in hiring, discharge, or promotions based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin).
280 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) (prohibiting sexual discrimination based on the pay-
ment of disparate wages).
281 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993) (proscribing discrimination in the workplace by
prohibiting racial discrimination in the making or enforcing of contracts).
282 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (prohibiting a violation of constitutional or statutory
rights under color of state law).
283 The issue of whether punitive damages with respect to nonphysical injuries are
excludable under § 104(a)(2) is beyond the scope of this note. Since the 1989 amend-
ment to § 104(a)(2), the issue has created a split in the circuits. Compare Hawkins v.
United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S.
Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-944), Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994) and Com-
missioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that pre-1989 punitive damages
do not qualify for the exclusion in § 104(a)(2)) with Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d
625 (6th Cir. 1994) (excluding pre-1989 punitive damages from income under §
104(a) (2)).
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A. Prior Case Law
The Supreme Court as well as the lower courts have long
held, without question, that employment discrimination is an "in-
vidious practice that causes grave harm to its victims."284 Given
the implicit notion of grave personal harm in employment discrim-
ination, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have consistently
held that federal employment antidiscrimination claims are
tort-like and personal in nature."s Moreover, the Burke court ex-
plicitly left the door open for future tort-like interpretations by
stating that there is "[n]o doubt [that] discrimination could con-
stitute a 'personal injury' for purposes of § 104(a)(2) ....28
The following is a discussion showing that the majority of courts,
which have considered the issue, have concluded that federal
antidiscrimination suits are personal in nature; therefore, awards
or settlements received for such suits are excludable under section
104(a) (2) as "damages received ... on account of personal inju-
ries or sickness."
In ADEA cases, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Tax Court,
the Court of Federal Claims, and several district courts have con-
cluded after Burke that section 104(a)(2) excludes damages or
settlements under the ADEA gross income. 7 In cases decided
before Burke, the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits also held that
section 104(a)(2) excludes ADEA damages from gross income."
284 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1872-73 (1992) (citing Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)); id. at 1878-79 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (citing
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987))
285 See infra notes 287-302 and accompanying text for examples of courts holding that
awards or settlements in federal discrimination were excludable from income because
they were awarded on account of personal injury.
286 Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874.
287 Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63
U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1994) (No. 94-944); Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1119
(5th Cir.) (table), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994) (No. 94-500); Purcell v. Seguin
State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1993); Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed.
Cl. 396 (1994), appeal filed, Fed. Cir. No. 94-5107; Rice v. United States, 834 F. Supp.
1241 (E.D. Cal. 1993), af/'d in unpublished opinion, 35 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 1994); Klein v.
Sec. of Transportation, 807 F. Supp. 1517 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Downey v. Commissioner,
100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W.
3476 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1994) (No. 94-999); Renner v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 94,263
(1994). But see Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), petition for cert.
filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1994) (No. 94-999); Drase v. United States, 866 F.
Supp. 1077 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Shaw v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 1378 (M.D. Ala. 1994);
Maleszewski v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
288 Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991); Pistillo v.
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In addition, several circuits, while deciding other issues, have im-
plicitly concluded that ADEA damages were excludable from gross
income." 9
In the only Equal Pay Act case after Burke, the Tax Court, in
Bennett v. Commissioner," addressed the issue of excludability of
awards or settlements under section 104(a) (2). In Bennett, the Tax
Court concluded that section 104(a) (2) excluded EPA liquidated
damages from gross income."'
In post-1991 Title VII claims, the IRS, in Revenue Ruling 93-
88, ruled that "amounts received in satisfaction of claims of dispa-
rate treatment discrimination ... are excludable under section
104(a) (2) of the Code." 2  Perhaps because of the IRS's ruling,
few courts have examined whether section 104(a) (2) excludes
awards received under amended Title VII from gross income.293
Similar to amounts awarded under amended Title VII, the
IRS, in Revenue Ruling 93-88, ruled that "amounts received in
satisfaction of claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act are
also excludable" under section 104(a) (2). 4 Currently, no court
has addi'essed the exclusion issue in the context of the ADA. Giv-
en the fact that the ADA's remedial scheme tracks amended Title
VII's remedial scheme, the courts should find that section
104(a) (2) excludes ADA awards from gross income."
The Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Garcia, 6 held that section
1983 violations are an "injury to the individual rights of a per-
son." 7 Utilizing Wilson's interpretation of the essence of a sec-
Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d
Cir. 1990).
289 Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228, 234 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Commissioner v. Miller,
914 F.2d 586, 591 n.8 (4th Cir. 1990).
290 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 94,190 (1994).
291 Id. at 964. The Bennett court did not determine if § 104(a)(2) excluded the
taxpayer's backpay award from gross income because the taxpayer did not contest its tax-
ability. Id. at 962. Before Burke, the Tax Court, in Thompson v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.
632 (1987), af/'d 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989), held that § 104(a)(2) excluded liquidated
damages but not backpay awarded under the EPA from gross income.
292 Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
293 See Stender v. Lucky Stores, No. C-88-1467 MHP, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18721, at
*6-7 (N.D. Cal. December 20, 1993) (holding that "[i]t follows from Burke that settlement
awards under post-Act Title VII must be excluded from gross income.").
294 Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
295 The remedial scheme of the ADA tracks that of Title VII. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§
1981a(a)(2) (Supp. V 1994) and 12117 (Supp. V 1994) (ADA) with 42 U.S.C. §§
1981a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1994) and 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1994) (Tide VII).
296 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
297 Id. at 277. In Wilson, the Court, looking at the essence of the claim, determined
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tion 1983 claim, the Third and Tenth Circuits as well as the Tax
Court have held pre-Burke that section 104(a) (2) excluded section
1983 awards from gross income. 98
In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,21 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a section 1981 suit is a claim based on a "fundamental
injury to the individual rights of a person."' Consistent with this
notion, the IRS, in Revenue Ruling 93-88, ruled that "amounts
received in satisfaction of claims of disparate treatment discrimi-
nation ... under section 1981 are excludable under section
104(a) (2).11311 Furthermore, the sole district court to consider the
issue after Burke held that "settlement awards under section 1981




The adoption of the per se approach is consistent with sound
public policy. As previously discussed in Part V., some commenta-
tors have argued that sound tax or public policy does support the
section 104(a) (2) exclusion.3  However, this Note argues that
the compassion or humanitarian theory, the bunching of income
theory, as well as other theories justify the exclusion of federal
employment discrimination awards from gross income under sec-
tion 104(a) (2). A brief description of this reasoning follows.
First, the purposes of the equal employment opportunity laws
support the per se approach. The Court has long held that the
purpose of the equal employment opportunity laws is "to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of...
employees over other employees.""°4 In addition, Congress enact-
that § 1983's closest state analog was a claim for personal injury. Id.
298 Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 873 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding § 1983
award not taxable); Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that
settlement amounts received in lieu of damages for mental pain and suffering; emotional
distress; and lost wages were excludable from gross income); Metzger v. Commissioner, 88
T.C. 834, 858 (1987), affd without published opinion, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).
299 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
300 Id. at 661. In Goodman, the Court, looking at the essence of the claim, deter-
mined that § 1981's closest state analog was a claim for personal injury. Id.
301 Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
302 Stender v. Lucky Stores, No. C-88-1467 MHP, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18721, at *6
(N.D. Cal. December 20, 1993).
303 See supra notes 244-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the public policy
alternatives.
304 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (stating Congress'
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ed the federal antidiscrimination statutes to prevent the human
suffering associated with prejudice in the workplace. For example,
Congress enacted the ADEA "to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age. " "°s In other
words, Congress enacted the ADEA to ensure equal opportunity of
employment for older workers and to prevent the basic human
suffering associated with unfounded age prejudice. By adopting
the per se approach, the Supreme Court would effectuate its goal
of "eradicat[ing employment] discrimination throughout the econ-
omy.""'6 In addition, the Court would further the humanitarian
objectives of the federal equal opportunity employment laws as
well as the section 104(a)(2) personal injury exclusion. 3 7
Second, the adoption of a per se rule would end the on-going
confusion that results from using the "case-by-case" or "facts and
circumstances" approach to determine whether section 104(a) (2)
excludes employment discrimination awards from gross income.
Congress enacted the predecessor to section 104(a) (2) as well as
section 104(a) (2) before the advent of federal employment dis-
crimination claims. Without the knowledge of future
antidiscrimination statutes, Congress was unable to foresee the
present problems of interpreting section 104(a)(2) in the employ-
ment discrimination context."8  These interpretative problems
have resulted in divergent rulings. For example, the same court
has held that an EPA (gender discrimination in the payment of
wages) award was taxable and implied that an ADEA (age discrimi-
nation) award was non-taxable even though both actions were
based on the violation of federal antidiscrimination statutes with
similar purposes, the eradication of employment discrimina-
tion.' By adopting the per se approach, the Supreme Court
would provide consistent tax treatment to victims of discrimination
under federal antidiscrimination laws.
objective in enacting Title VII).
305 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
306 Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
307 See Respondent's Brief at 24, Schejer (No. 94-500); see also supra notes 246-52 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the humanitarian policy underlying § 104(a)(2).
308 See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 104(a)(2)'s
historical background.
309 Compare Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
EPA liquidated damages are not excludable under § 104(a)(2)) with Commissioner v.
Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 591 n.8 (4th Cir. 1990) (implying that ADEA damages are fully
excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2)).
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Third, a per se approach would eliminate the potential manip-
ulation of settlements, damage awards, and claims. Currently, com-
mentators suggest that the forward thinking practitioner, in em-
ployment discrimination suits, should plead multiple claims."' 0
The commentators suggest that these claims should allege a viola-
tion of the federal antidiscrimination laws as well as violations of
state tort-like claims, such as defamation or intentional infliction
of emotional distress. By pleading state and federal claims, the
alleging party increases the likelihood of exclusion under section
104(a) (2). For example, a plaintiff sues for employment discrimi-
nation under the ADEA and for intentional infliction of emotional
distress under state law, knowing that the facts may not fully sup-
port his claim for the latter. At the conclusion of the trial, the
jury awards the plaintiff $10,000, which has not been allocated
between the claims. In this case, the plaintiff is in a position to
argue for allocation to the nontaxable state claim even though the
jury may have awarded the damages solely as compensation for the
ADEA claim. Congress' intent in enacting section 104(a) (2) was
not to promote this type of manipulation; a per se rule would help
to eradicate the perceived need for such crafty strategies.
Finally, a per se approach would encourage settlements in
employment discrimination cases, thereby promoting judicial and
administrative efficiency. Currently, the law discourages settlement
between the parties because the IRS usually challenges allocations
made solely between the parties, but not allocations made by the
courts."' A per se rule would eliminate this risk. By alleviating
some of the risk of settlement, the Court would promote negotia-
tions and settlement prior to trial between the parties.
C. Consistency with United States v. Burke
The adoption of a per se rule is consistent with the Court's
holding in United States v. Burke. In Burke, eight of the Justices en-
dorsed the Treasury Regulation's tort-like standard as the proper
test for determining whether damages were received on account of
personal injury.312 A per se rule would not require the Court to
310 See Richard T. Helleloid & Lucretia S.W. Mattson, Has the Scope of the Personal
Injury Exclusion Been Changed by the Supreme Court?, 77 J. TAx'N 82, 86 (1992); Knight et
al., supra note 10, at 108-109.
311 See Knight et al., supra note 10, at 109 (asserting that it is "unlikely that the IRS
will successfully challenge a court allocation" of damages).
312 In Burke, Justice Scalia rejected the "tort-like" standard as not within the range of
reasonable interpretation of § 104(a)(2). See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text; cf
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discard the Burke tort-like standard for determining whether a
claim was a "personal injury" claim under section 104(a)(2). Fur-
thermore, neither the government nor the taxpayers have argued
to discard, either in the Supreme Court or below, the tort-like
standard."' In addition, the Court could find that Burke was de-
cided narrowly and applies only to claims based on pre-1991 Title
VII. Congress amended Title VII in 1991, and Burke involved a
underlying claim based upon pre-1991 Title VII. t4 Many courts
and commentators have argued that the amendments, coupled
with the Court's remarks in Burke, effectively limit Burke's
precedential value."' More to the point, while the Court seemed
to implicitly limit its holding by refusing to "import" amended
Title VII into its analysis, 16 the IRS in 1993 expressly ruled that
section 104(a)(2) excludes all amounts received in connection




Statistics show an increase in the size and number of federal
employment discrimination suits. 318 In Commissioner v. Scleier, the
Heen, supra note 10, at 606 ("The 'tort-like' standard should be replaced with an alterna-
tive human capital approach."); Sciuto, supra note 32, at 307 (characterizing Justice(
Scalia's approach as the most "common-sense" interpretation of § 104(a)(2)). But see
United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1878 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (referring
to the Court's deference to the Treasury Regulations as "proper"). Since the Burke deci-
sion, Justices Blackmun and White, both members of the majority in Burke, have retired
from the Court. After the retirement of Justices Blackmun and White, Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer joined the Court. Neither Justice Ginsburg nor Justice Breyer has previously
stated an opinion on whether § 104(a)(2) excludes federal employment discrimination
awards from gross income.
313 Petitioner's Brief, Scheier (No. 94-500); Respondent's Brief, Schlier (No. 94-500);
see United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1877 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I must
acknowledge that [discarding the IRS regulation] . . . has not been argued by the Unit-
ed States, here or below.").
314 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Con-
gress amended Title VII to provide for a jury trial and additional remedies. The addi-
tional remedies include punitive damages and compensatory damages for future pecuniary
losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
and other nonpecuniary losses. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1073 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
315 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
316 Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874 n.12; see id. at 1881 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (remar-
king that the case was decided narrowly).
317 Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
318 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court should take a constructive step forward by pre-
sumptively deciding that section 104(a) (2) excludes certain federal
employment discrimination awards or settlements from gross in-
come. One commentator has asserted that the Burke Court decid-
ed narrowly, "hoping that Congress [would] sit up, take notice,"
and provide clarification.319 Three years later, Congress has not
acted. Furthermore, the lower courts, as shown in divergent opin-
ions, have not provided a consistent interpretation of section
104(a) (2).
To alleviate continued litigation, promote consistent and pre-
dictable results, and effectuate the underlying purpose of the fed-
eral equal opportunity laws, the Supreme Court should adopt a per
se approach providing that federal employment discrimination
claims are tort-like, and therefore constitute a claim for "personal
injury" under section 104(a) (2). By adopting a per se rule, the Su-
preme Court will have taken a constructive first step.
Andrew M. Wrighf
319 Sciuto, supra note 32, at 308.
* The author would like to thank Professors Matthew J. Barrett, Mary Gillmarten,
and Barbara J. Fick for their assistance in reviewing this Note. Special thanks and appre-
ciation are due my wife, Laura, for her support and thoughtfulness throughout the prep-
aration of this note.
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